

## **A Definition of Planning**

Mark Alvarez

December 4, 1990

1960-1970

As a prospective planner, I thought carefully about the normative definitions of planning, from planning literature, and found not one that completely described the most salient elements and conflicts that define urban and regional planning. Webster's Ninth New College Dictionary superficially offered something of a one-size-fits-all definition.

**plan.ning** *n* (1748) : the act or process of making or carrying out plans:

*specif* : the establishment of goals, policies, and procedures for a social or economic unit (city- ) (business- )

I found no guide to define a personal set of professional norms that I, either a virtuous idealist or a heretical determinist, could count on through a planning career. I then decided that if I tour through the thoughts of great thinkers, and the people that we think are great thinkers, that I might discover some great truth when I look back on all of the postcards and souvenirs that I've collected from the places that I have visited.

I found two kinds of places: ideal places that had lofty mountains, and real places that were real flat. The people in both kinds of places talked about three kinds of things: Why things were the way they were, what things were, and how things were made.

Similarly, the definition of planning has three parts: \*

Part 1. is about why we make decisions: where the motives that underlie our decisions for making plans come from.

Part 2. is about the substance that the plans are made of: the plans as urban contracts.

Part 3. is about how we get the plans done: the execution of contracts.

In three clauses, planning is:

**plan.ning** *n* (1990) : considering the ideal and feasible motives of the ideas of one's self and of others, thinking of ideal values and feasible plans to bring values to bear on a community, and executing those plans to occur in an ideal manner and in a feasible manner.

This is not an operatively useful definition of normative planning, because of contradictions in each clause. That it is contradictory, is the most salient point of the definition. Planning is an endeavor suffused with contradictions in norms, values, legitimacy, and responsibility.

Why should a definition try to resolve value and goal conflicts? Why should a definition try to prescribe norms? The principal problem that planners will face time and time again, are the conflicts: of ethics, of morality, of equity, of values, and

of the appropriate representation of values. These are not conflicts that can be resolved by discoveries of values per situation. Such an ad hoc approach to value and goal discovery becomes dysfunctional as the resolutions that are found will always be bound by the constraints of each situation. The constraints will always differ, and then, so will our values. Personally and professionally, it is detrimental to have such a capricious approach to the formation of values and goals. Goals and values must be defined now, without compromise, by purposeful exploration of a personal definition of planning. We will then know who, or what we stand for in the midst of confusion and conflicts.

To discover a truly normative definition, I try to reconcile the conflicts in each of the three parts. The sum of the three parts: from where ideas come, what the ideas and plans are, and how to make the ideas and plans real, as a system of the consideration of plans and ideas, can adequately shape a situational definition of planning. In each of the three parts, there are two camps from which to work. There is no choice. In one camp there are goals to work towards, no matter how unattainable. In each of the three parts, this is the normative definition, not derived from observation of what is, but from consideration of what should be. In the other camp, there are only techniques and ways to get things done. This is the descriptive definition. It describes what planning is now, aside from what it should be. If we can't realize our planning goals today, then we need a description of how to keep our jobs, and sustain the profession until we can.

Simultaneously and paradoxically, a planner must belong to both camps. A planner who only gets things done, and considers doing things to be a goal in itself fails to distinguish himself or herself from all of the other people who simply get things done. We must all eat and breath to live another day, but that does not distinguish us in any way from a housefly landing on scrap of gristle. A planner that lives within an ivory tower of lofty ideals, fails to do anything for anybody, and fails to sustain a profession if those ideals are never compromised to take a first step toward doing something. One walks, but has no direction, the other knows the way but never walks.

1. As planners of conscience, we find ourselves first setting our own values, not rationally, but by some *arational* perceived system of phenomena, intuitions, thoughts, and events of the past, present, and future. If we are very lucky, and they are just like the system of some other academic's ideas, we can give it a name, like Marxism. With value goals in mind, we then try to see how we can fit them into the real world. It's a game of *rational* solitaire, in which we lay out all of the cards that

we can find (not all of the cards that were and will ever be) that represent as inputs, our values, and the environment as it is, and then order them, building one rational idea from another until the order reveals the best way to reach a goal.

2. The substance of the plan is a mixture of the same paradoxical elements. Half of the plan, the strategic plan, struggles to define normative goals for a community's course of future action. The responsibility of defining these goals belongs to professional planners, not a process of opinion aggregation. Professional rendering of opinion, and responsibility to that opinion, is the charge of being a professional. The other half of the plan, a strategic plan, fulfills the goals of the first half, one incremental, satisficing step at a time.

3. Implementation, at the surface, seems to be the topic of the political debate. This at first seems to be something that concerns the people of the real flat land. Here, in the present and real world of getting plans to action, effective planners become the heretics of their own profession. The most fundamental tenet of any profession is that it exists because of the extraordinary competence of its members at performing a particular task. Professional planning dogma also establishes that good planners must remain untarnished by politics. This leaves planners without tools. The reality of the American environment is that its founding declaration of purpose states that the ultimate power to act is based on the sum of the opinions of laymen, not on the considered opinions of professionals. To be effective in the real world of implementation, we must defy the most salient tenet of our own professional dogma, that planners must be apolitical. As illegitimate heretics, we have no norms and no goals, only ways to get things done: the acts of political advocacy.. In the political / apolitical debate, I found no normative goal for planning.

Surprisingly, from the teachings of Aristotle, emerged a corollary goal. Using the model of the ideal polis, planners could function very well if their political power, to decide on plans for the public good and act towards singular goals based on their deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the polis, were legitimate. This goal does not suggest a sovereign, forth branch of government comprised of the princes of planning. It does suggest that planning be structurally congruous with the system of checks and balances of American constitutional government by empowering planners within an equal branch of a tripartite decision making structure. The goal for implementation, then, is a change of political structure and professional norms to let planners legally represent the public good.

# 1.

## Values, Mathematics, and Conscience

From what do planners plan? Is it worthwhile to consider the theories of planning and our own theories of action and decision, or is it an idle diversion to commitment? If we find any answers, do we use our theories to compel action, or to justify prior deeds and phenomena? Warning us to pay closer attention to our own motives, John Maynard Keynes wrote this about philosophy:

"Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from intellectual influences, are usually the slave of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back." 1.

Whether by cognitive effort or not, our actions are based in some system of thought, or some system of inspiration. Phenomenologically, those actions become encompassed into the motives for our future actions. The experiences and thoughts of the past, present, and future fit together into an order that underlies our motives. If we are to attempt to understand our actions as a system by which we can plan other action, it is necessary to understand the order of our mind within an encompassing dielectic. 2.

To systematically understand the mind from which our decisions originate, we first consider the parentage of our thoughts, the paradigms to which our philosophy is kin to. Like parents, there are paradigms that are close to us which we know well, and there are paradigms that gave original birth many generations before. Planning's Abraham of paradigms is rationality. A rational, scientific thought process shapes and links the theory, shared values, and methods of problem solution for the planning profession. The alternative, arational paradigms are trivial by comparison. They do not even address the same issues to be rationality's peer. They are paradigms of middle descent that depend on rational thought, and rational actors to describe their systems. For example, the political economy approach can not explain the distribution of power, the behavior of classes, or the behavior of economies without dependence on the archetypes of rational actors and their rational behavior. The alternative paradigms simply question values (such as equity) within the framework of rational thought. Their questions and alternative values are of great importance, but they do not fundamentally explain the formulation of planning decisions.

Rationality can trace its roots to the scientific revolution in 17th century Europe, specifically to the philosophical views of Rene' Descartes, which seminally influenced modern thought to the present. Descartes believed that, with the adoption of mathematical method, fully certain knowledge is obtainable in nature. According to him, with the certainty of mathematics, we could directly intuit clear and distinct component ideas from observable phenomena and other ideas, and then demonstrate further properties and ideas that were not initially evident, or within the bounds of observation. From Descartes on, everything in the world was deemed appropriate for mathematical analysis. Rationally, new theories could be discovered from other theories without directly observable phenomena. In this way a lineage of new paradigms could descend from rationality.

Rationality's mathematical rules provide a *value-free* system for decision making and discovery. In its insensitivity to values, is where rationality falls short, but never breaks down, for planning. Rational thought works well for explaining mathematics, and the physical sciences in which explanations are free from the influence of values, or are of strictly singular values. (evolution, and unified theories are the notable exceptions) When applied to the social sciences (political science, economics, planning), rational thought fails to discover unifying values, if they are not already existent and observable. The problem of the plurality and diversity of goals is encountered. Diverse groups with diverse values cannot attempt to agree by a universal method, on singular optimal solutions. The problem of appropriate bounds is also encountered. Rationality treats the bounds of a problem as the limits of a function. Such limits, which can often result in intangible values, such as infinity, are irrelevant, and imply earlier bounds, disunities, or anomalies. If the method is not challenged, and rationality is so basic to our thought that it seldom is, then the solutions are challenged. Typically, this results in a futile process to search for new data to rationally discover new solutions that fit predominant value systems better.

Arrational paradigms attempt to define satisfactory values at rationality's limits. As it is for anything normative, plurality is still a problem. The appropriateness for the application or adherence to arrational paradigms is their discovery of normative values through social observation, intuition, or divine reason, instead of value-free mathematics.

For planners, clarity in plan discovery and verification can only come about through planners' adoption of at least two normative paradigms: one to serve value goals, the other to serve method and technology. A society has values, and a human

planner has values. The goal of value resolution can only come about through the common adoption of similar arational norms. If no agreement is possible, as is often true because of social diversity, the planner must have the value awareness of self and others, in order to communicate and deliberate goals. This can only be addressed by arational normative paradigms.

With value derived goals set from the younger arational paradigms, a planner then needs the value-free scientific method with which to explain phenomena and discover solutions without interference from spurious values. This purpose is robustly served by the rational decision-making paradigm.

## 2.

### The Plan of Fedora

#### Cities and Desire 4

In the center of Fedora, that gray stone metropolis, stands a metal building with a crystal globe in every room. Looking into each globe, you see a blue city, the model of a different Fedora. These are the forms the city could have taken if, for one reason or another, it had not become what we see today. In every age someone, looking at Fedora as it was, imagined a way of making it the ideal city, but while he constructed his miniature model, Fedora was already no longer the same as before, and what had been until yesterday a possible future became only a toy in a glass globe.

The building with the globes is now Fedora's museum: every inhabitant visits it, chooses the city that corresponds to his desires, contemplates it, imagining his reflection in the medusa pond that would have collected the waters of the canal (if it had not been dried up), the view from the high canopied box along the avenue reserved for elephants (now banished from the city), the fun of sliding down the spiral, twisting minaret (which never found a pedestal from which to rise).

On the map of your empire, O Great Khan, there must be room for both the big, stone Fedora and the little Fedoras in the glass globes. Not because they are all equally real, but because all are only assumptions. The one contains what is accepted as necessary when it is not yet so; the others, what is imagined as possible and, a moment later, is possible no longer.

Italo Calvino

*Invisible Cities* (1972) 3.

What are the plans that planners plan? Do planners define from their rational, socially moral imaginations a comprehensive model of the most ideal city in which to live? Do planners walk the street outside of their office, pick up a bit of litter, and consider it a deed done well in the long chain of incremental improvements exacted or inflicted on a city?

This is about the substance of things, which within planning, is the study of what the plans are. In the high lands of ultimate goals, there is the notion of the comprehensive plan. In the real flat lands, there are strategic plans. Alan Altshuler

defines the master plan as a goal serving guide to which all other plans are subordinate. Subordinate plans are to be specific amendments to the constitutional nature of the master plan. New proposals are evaluated in the light of the master plan with respect to their coordination with all adopted plans, to further the public interest. To this, Altshuler firmly attests that every planner 'must be guided by *some* conception of the public interest.' 4. The word *some* is emphasized as a contrast to a guiding conception of the public interest. Furthermore, goals can legitimately represent the community only if the 'community or its legitimate representatives ratify them after serious discussion and deliberation.' 5.

Altshuler points to three reasons for the failure of the comprehensive plan: that the plan's broadly defined goals fail to stimulate public interest, that comprehensive interrelations are too overwhelming for comprehension, and that only partial goals can be successfully decided.

Because of the diverse needs of a plural society, according to Charles Lindblom, even if these three failures are overcome, a comprehensive plan fails because of basic flaws in the process of aggregation of opinions.

'The first difficulty is that on many critical values or objectives, citizens disagree, congressmen disagree, and public administrators disagree.

Administrators cannot escape these conflicts by ascertaining the majority's preference, for preferences have not been registered on most issues; indeed, there are often no preferences in the absence of public discussion sufficient to bring the issue to the attention of the electorate. Furthermore, there is a question of whether intensity of feeling should be considered as well as the number of persons preferring each alternative. By the impossibility of doing otherwise, administrators are often reduced to deciding policy without clarifying objectives first.' 6.

If the public interest can not be defined, then a goal for the comprehensive plan cannot be defined. The comprehensive plan is strictly goal oriented. Therefore, the comprehensive plan can not be defined.

Strategic planning is offered as the real, working solution. It was first described as a management tool for the utility maximization of corporations operating in a competitive market economy. Strategic plans are characterized by: action orientation, consideration of stakeholders, attention to external threats and opportunities and internal weaknesses and strengths(SWOT), attention to competition, and a dynamic nature linked to the changing environment.

It works well for market actors because these bodies are characterized by an irrefutably singular goal, profit maximization. Normative values of market

participants are singular too: profit maximization. The strategic plan overcomes the comprehensive plan's most critical problem by simply simply ignoring it. As a tool for an environment in which values are singular and clearly defined, the strategic plan makes no attempt at defining any normative values or goals.

Having jumped that first step, the strategic plan proceeds to generate and implement real solutions to concrete problems in a purely mathematical, rational way. The limits of the function are defined (SWOT), all of the pertinent factors and the function are defined (mission), and the bounded solution is sketched (action).

Applied to city planning, the conflict again, is in that there are plans that have goals, and plans that get done. One plan is severely nearsighted cast in the scope of a city's plans; the other plan is crippled. As presented, they are mutually exclusive. Planners need both plans. To define a profession, normative values are needed to define thoughtful goals for a city. Planners need the comprehensive plan to search for a goal, but the comprehensive plan does not need the absolute aggregation of opinion to form values. As Lindblom points out, perfect representation is impossible and not even defined. If planners, as professionals with uniquely qualifying skills are the most fit to judge the value of a plan, then the aggregation of the opinions of planning professionals, whose agreement is much more feasible (because of established professional norms) than that of laymen and politicians, is a more valid way to define goals.

In the light of the comprehensive plan, coherent strategic plans will be the device by which changes take place. Regarding each situation independently, strategic plans accomplish what *can* be done towards the goal of the comprehensive plan.

### 3. S.P.Q.R.

'The Senate and the People of Rome': a constitutional tenet, and a political maxim stamped in stone reminded the populace and the patricians of Rome of the formula of balance that would sustain the greatness of their empire as long as they remembered it.

Aristotle describes the polis, the best possible state, as consisting of two elements in balance: aristocracy, and democracy. Aristocracy is in principle, the rule of wisdom, constitutionally the rule of the few, and socially the rule of the wealthy. Democracy is in principle the rule of opinion, constitutionally the rule of many, and socially the rule of the poor. A synthesis of the best of both is the most likely to render stable and fair government.

The polis would unite the best of the two elements of government to construct the best state, consent and wisdom. The consent of citizens would provide equity in government. The wisdom of the aristocracy would provide the stability and mission lacking in the opinions of men not fit to be consent giving citizens.

A congress of fifty-six representatives described the tenets of their best possible state in the American Declaration of Independence as the following:

We hold these Truths to be self evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and Happiness - That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive to these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundations on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. 7.

Appealing to the reader's sense of common rationality about divine endowments, American government is born from only one of the elements of Aristotle's polis, democracy: the rule of the poor, the rule of the many, the rule of opinion. The government derives its rule from the consent of the governed, their right to consent, derived from divine awards of rights. Nowhere is the principle of the rule of wisdom explicitly postulated. Implied, is that if men (people) derive their opinions from their creator, then their opinions represent wisdom, and that the sum of their wisdom empowers their government.

Norman Beckman describes the planner's role as that of a bureaucrat, the provider of wisdom. The planner should take the role of public employee to assist and serve policy makers with a special, professional competence. The planner should provide the policy maker with intellectual leadership of a long range bias to balance the policy maker's short range need to perform. In this way the role of government becomes harmonious with the public concern for the long term. This calls for non-partisan '...specialists who know their job and will, therefore, effectively execute the general rules decided upon by executive or legislative leadership in accordance with popular preferences.' 8.

But do we as planners fulfill the aristocratic ideal of wisdom rule to create the perfect American polis? Hardly. Beckman observantly describes the role of the planner as a hired consultant, a provider of wisdom, *serving* the popular preference. Aristotle describes the principle of the *rule* of wisdom, not the advice or provision of wisdom aside to, or driven by the rule of opinion.

The rule of mere opinion prevails because we believe that if citizens are equal in creation and in the rights to life, liberty, and happiness, then citizens are equal in all things: knowledge, maturity, intelligence, social values. We elect politicians, who are not of a select aristocracy, but are of the many, perhaps better or perhaps worse fit, to wisely lead a national mission as legitimate representatives of the plebs. Under these circumstances, elected officials can only provide rule by opinion, now stratified into opinions of lesser importance and opinions of greater importance.

As planners, we are to provide wisdom aside all of this. If we believe that our plans can create a better polis, a valid opinion if we possess the knowledge, maturity, intelligence, and social rationality to be fit citizens, and if we are fit to have been good aristocrats in a true polis, then we find that we have no constitutional or social rule as Beckman's bureaucrats to ever hope to benefit society with our plans. As bureaucratic public employees we can only whisper opinions in the ears of the legitimate, or legitimized representatives of the people, who are burdened with the numerous opinions of the many, of the important, and the edict of simultaneously representing them all.

This is the less than ideal framework in which planners must aspire to the Aristotelian aristocratic roles that complete the ideal state. In embracing the role of aristocrat of the polis, planners must attain power equivalent in force to the power of political mandate. John Forester argues that this source of power in planning is the control of information.

"...planners shape not only documents, but also participation: who is contacted, who participates in informal design review meetings, who persuades whom of which options for project development. Planners do so not only by shaping which facts certain citizens may have, but also by shaping the trust and expectations of those citizens. Planners organize cooperation, or acquiescence, in addition to data and sketches. They are often not authoritative problem-solvers, as stereotypical engineers may be, but, instead they are organizers (or disorganizers) of public attention: selectively shaping attention to options for action, particular costs and benefits, or particular arguments for and against proposals." 9.

Forester further argues that misinformation, both systematic and ad hoc undermines well-informed planning and citizen participation by manipulating citizens' beliefs, sense of relevant problems, and consent. According to Forester, planners can and should counteract these nefarious influences by presenting to citizens in a timely manner, correct information or their own benign and justifiable distortions. However wicked and underhanded it may seem, Forester presents a solution to the political dilemma of planners, that empirically seems to work at times in a diverse and plural society. This solution defines the role of the activist or advocate planner.

Paul Davidoff takes this role even further to reject the most salient aspect of civic planning, and suggests that planning should not be value neutral. A planner should be sensitive to his or her own values, understand them, represent them, and induce the participation of other similarly opinioned citizens. In this model, advocate groups, planning agencies, and government all compete with their best effort. The competition leads to superior plans by a market process, which politically results in the rule of opinion.

Both Davidoff and Forester address the problem of aristocratic leadership roles for planners, but they fall short of providing reliable roles for planners. Historically, advocacy has provided superior results in some instances, and poor results in others. Advocacy planning theories do not provide any system to forecast their performance for various situations.

Underlying advocacy planning is a fallacy of democratic belief. This is the belief that because people are equal in some things, that they are equal in all things. Forester assumes that errors and misjudgments are arrived at only by misinformed citizens. Both leave final decisions, no matter how well informed the parties, to rule by opinion. Lay citizens are limited in their ability to become as wise (knowledge, maturity, social values) as planners because they cannot spend the time to assimilate

the knowledge and experience of the planner. This is an insurmountable structural problem of a society founded on the division of labor. Lay people simply have other things to do. Democracy is well served by the roles of advocacy when knowledgeable citizens, and more rigorously argued decisions are the result. However, because of the limitations imposed on citizens, and the capricious nature of rule by opinion, poor plans *can* result from advocacy, and from information as well as misinformation.

What we need is the dichotomous political structure called for in Aristotle's polis; the inclusion of aristocrats participating in the rule of wisdom. Common American experience has taught us to be suspicious of the notion of rule by aristocracy since colonial times. The aristocracy to which Aristotle refers has little to do with the American stereotype of venal, self-serving, colonial aristocracy. He refers to an aristocracy of talent in contrast to an aristocracy of birth. In Aristotle's time, the aristocrats are admittedly usually the fewer, wealthy members of the political community, because of the division of labor. In the 20th century, we have professionalized the polis aristocrats into the divisions of labor. Aristocracy no longer needs to mean the rule of the few, and the wealthy, but simply the rule of talented professionals, and the rule of wisdom. For civic planning, the 'self evident Truths' that shape American government exclude "the rule".

Absolute power corrupts, but absolute democracy stagnates. Thirteen years after the declaration of independence the constitution recognized these limitations of a completely participatory democracy, and ratified executive power, and judiciary power. It devised a balance of power among the three powers that is similar to the balance of power that the aristocratic planners of the polis could complete in civic planning. The Congress, the legislative branch of the government, fulfills Aristotle's rule of opinion (Article I). The Presidency (and its cabinet), the executive branch, provides the rule for unified, comprehensively considered action (Article II). In this article, the constitution recognizes the weaknesses of the rule of opinion to produce action, and to produce singular goals for the good of a greater public. The Supreme Court, the judiciary branch of the government, is Aristotle's rule of wisdom (Article III). In creating the powers of a supreme court, the Constitution recognizes the limitations of its individual citizens to be fit to proffer opinions for which they are insufficiently experienced and learned. The Supreme Court is not comprised of a lay jury, but of 11 selected citizens deemed fit to render wise opinions. Finally, there are constitutional checks and balances among the three, so that no one branch ever has absolute power, or the last word.

The proposal of a planning aristocracy proposes nothing more radical than the Constitution proposes. Planning aristocracy is not an affront to the American way of life. Instead, it affirms it. Planning aristocracy extends the constitutional division of rule to the planning profession.

In Beckman's bureaucratic planning world, the planner provides the wisdom, the chief administrator of the bureaucracy has executive power to act, and the populace rules by opinion, and is to be ultimately served. Each branch is represented. In government, each branch holds equal power in balance of the other two. This is not so in bureaucracy. Beckman's bureaucratic roles grant: decision making power to the chief executive, subservient to the will of the populace; ultimate and disproportionately large powers of decision making to the populace; and no decision making power to the planner. Because of this, Beckman's bureaucratic planning model is dysfunctional.

Aristocratic planning proposes exactly this:

1. The representation of the public, in matters that concern the public good, should be potent and accessible to all.
2. Bureaucratic executives should have the power to act (checked, consulted, or advised by the other two branches) comprehensively toward singular goals. Furthermore, these executives can be planners (professionally educated or experienced as planners) themselves, and may have other planners serving as an advisory cabinet (Beckman's role for the planner).
3. There can be planners outside of the bureaucracy. These planners should have the power to decide on plans for the public good when the public opinion is in dissent. Their right to perform this function is justified by the excellence of their technical competency, and legitimated by ratified consent to hold this position.

As planners we should work toward institutionalizing planners' roles as legitimate participants of political power who defend the rule of wisdom to balance the rule of opinion, instead of supporting the accepted professional norms of legitimation through strictly apolitical technical competence. That is a goal. To satisfactorily operate in a merely acceptable political and social framework is not a goal, but merely a definition of survival.

## Advocacy

### The Ends Justify the Means

If this is end goal to which professional planners must work, then the immediate concern is successfully guiding a disparate, political body, unconsciously discordant with itself. This is the problem for which advocacy provides suggestions as solutions. In *Discourses*, Machiavelli notes and substantiates by examples the justification for advocacy roles in republics ruled by popular opinion.

'First of all, the populace misled by the false appearance of good, often seeks its own ruin, and, unless it be brought to realize what is bad and what is good for it by someone in whom it has confidence, brings on republics endless dangers and disasters.' 10.

If the planner, by virtue of professional legitimacy, holds the confidence of the populace, and by virtue of professional knowledge, possesses the wisdom to realize what is bad and what is good, then the planner is the ideal 'someone' to restrain an excited crowd from the demise of its own devices.

Paradoxically, if the planner engages in advocative roles, the confidence of the crowd is jeopardized, because the professional planner is expected to be apolitical. The advocate planner may be reduced to the status of illegitimate politician. With this occurrence, Machiavelli's observed republics fall to their worst fates.

'Again, when by ill chance the populace has no confidence in anyone at all, as sometimes happens owing to its having been deceived in the past either by events or by men, it spells ruin, and necessarily so.'

From this unreadiness to trust anybody it sometimes happens that a republic fails to reach the right decision, ...' 10.

He continues to explain how a populace can be deceived into following a course of action towards its own ruin by 'splendid hopes and rash promises.'

This may seem to be a scheme of little importance to planners whom value the betterment of their societies. Meyerson and Banfield suggest the converse to the same Machiavellian scheme in which the ends always justify the means. In the context of discussing the difference between particular issues and larger issues, Meyerson and Banfield suggest how a planner might attain the fulfillment of larger issues, by subverting or sublimating the the particular issues. They suggest that larger issues represent greater social value and equity, and particular issues

represent the values of smaller groups and less equity. If a sacrifice is to be made, 'the larger issue should be served at the expense of the particular one.' 11.

On explaining exactly how, in the real world of dissenting rational actors, one is to help the populace realize what is good from what is bad, they reject the notion of informing the public at all.

'Ordinarily, of course, it is bad strategy for a bargainer to reveal his end-system or, especially, to admit that he is much or mainly interested in some larger issue: usually he has to pretend that he is seeking to settle the particular issue on its merits and almost always he has to conceal the fact that he is trying to use the particular issue to improve his position with respect to some larger issue.

Therefore in describing a political process it is often necessary to distinguish between the ends a party professes (his nominal ends) and those he actually seeks (his real ones) and between what he professes is the relative importance of his ends and what is actually their relative importance.' 11.

In a present time removed from Aristotelian ideals, the ends justify the means.

Hopefully, the ends are good.

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